Solana DeFi & AI Agent Token Launchpad Liquidity Intelligence

Brent crude plunged 7% after the U.S. and Iran paused Strait of Hormuz strikes, lifting equities and DeFi tokens while bitcoin held near $65,000 ahead of a pivotal Fed decision Wednesday.

The sovereign wealth-backed asset manager tapped KAIO to bring one of its private market funds onchain across Base, Solana and Sui networks.

Coding agents are increasingly used to accelerate code generation in many downstream tasks, such as fixing bugs, building applications, and prototyping. However, despite their value as coding assistants, agent-generated code tends to be larger and more verbose than the corresponding human-written implementation. In this work, we show that the cause lies in the agent's own search process: while iterating toward a passing solution, an agent accumulates speculative edits, abandoned hypotheses, and temporary changes that persist into the final patch. This may seem harmless for a single patch, but the problem compounds as agents take responsibility for ever-larger portions of a codebase-a codebase that was once minimal and well-maintained slowly accumulates redundancy faster than it can be cleaned up, drifting to a state that is harder to maintain. Given the magnitude of this problem, we take a step towards alleviating this issue. First, we formally define this phenomenon as CodeSlop-the residual and functionally unnecessary edits commonly seen in AI-generated code. We then introduce our algorithm TRIM (Trajectory-guided Redundancy Identification and Minimization). Rather than minimizing CodeSlop directly, TRIM instead minimizes agent trajectories. As we show empirically, this indirect technique of minimizing CodeSlop is highly effective: TRIM cuts CodeSlop by 17.9%-32.9% across agentic scaffolds, with negligible performance regression. TRIM is also highly efficient, requiring roughly half the validation cost of algorithmic baselines such as Delta Debugging.

Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise. This paradigm remains necessary for AI-enabled systems, but it is no longer sufficient. In such systems, adversaries may influence prompts, retrieved content, sensor inputs, training data, memory, tools, or human-AI interaction loops to alter system behavior without directly compromising the underlying infrastructure. This paper reframes penetration testing for AI-enabled systems as objective-driven behavioral evaluation. We define an AI-enabled system as one in which learned models materially influence behavior affecting operational outcomes, and we define AI-enabled penetration as the feasible induction of AI-governed behavior that violates one or more operational objectives under an explicit threat model. This definition preserves conventional penetration testing while extending it to adversarial pathways such as prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, data poisoning, sensor manipulation, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. We further propose a testing workflow that identifies operational objectives, maps AI-governed behavior, analyzes adversarial influence surfaces, defines behavioral failure criteria, executes scenario-based tests, and reports evidence linking adversarial action to objective violation. A running example involving an AI-enabled security operations center assistant illustrates how penetration may occur through behavioral influence rather than infrastructure compromise. Together, the definitions, workflow, and example provide a technical framework for evaluating adversarial success in deployed AI-enabled systems.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly automate multi-step engineering and informatics workflows, yet they rarely ask how much effort a task actually requires. They often follow a maximum-context-first strategy--re-reading files and dependencies they have already seen--turning a one-line edit into a small code-base audit. We argue the missing capability is task-aware execution-scope estimation: judging a task's difficulty, the information it truly needs, and the shortest reliable path before committing budget. We formalize minimum-sufficient execution and the Agent Cognitive Redundancy Ratio (ACRR), and propose E3 (Estimate, Execute, Expand): the agent estimates an initial operating point, executes a minimum viable path, and expands scope only when verification fails. On MSE-Bench--a deterministic benchmark of 121 edits in a capability-controlled simulator--E3 matches the strongest baseline's 100% success while cutting cost by 85%, tokens by 91%, and inspected files by 92%, and further beats a strong adaptive retrieval baseline by 16%; the gains survive held-out instruction wording and essentially every cost weighting. A companion real-model harness (LLM-Case) corroborates the effect on a live gpt-4o agent editing a real open-source library, with every candidate patch graded by actually running the project's real pytest suite against a measured oracle: the over-reading is milder but real, and E3 is the leanest and fastest policy at comparable task success--its one shortfall a provider rate-limit, not a wrong edit. We frame this as a controlled probe of execution redundancy, not a measurement of any deployed agent, and position task-aware execution as a step toward engineering-grounded AI (EGAI)--agents whose effort is anchored in the engineering reality of the task. We release the framework and benchmark.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have moved beyond generating responses to executing multi-step tasks by calling tools, observing the results, and iteratively deciding the next action. Most agent systems run on desktops or servers, which support tool use and task automation. Mobile devices are also important agent environments because they are widely accessible and contain users' data, sensors, and daily-use applications. Existing mobile agents mainly operate smartphones through graphical user interface (GUI) actions such as tapping, swiping, and typing, which often form long, interface-dependent sequences, cannot directly access device capabilities, and make execution boundaries difficult to define. We present \textbf{PalmClaw}, an open-source agent framework that runs natively on mobile phones and manages the sessions, memory, skills, tools, and agent loop directly on the device. PalmClaw exposes device capabilities as device tools with explicit arguments, structured results, and clearly defined execution boundaries. This design enables agents to use mobile capabilities directly while keeping each action explicit and controlled. Experiments show an 11.5\% relative improvement in task success and a 94.9\% reduction in completion time over the strongest baseline, with lower setup burden and traces illustrating how execution boundaries are applied. Code is available at https://github.com/ModalityDance/PalmClaw.

Fidelity International’s Giselle Lai argues that the most compelling long-term use case for tokenized funds is balance-sheet management for large, global institutions, not 24/7 liquidity.

Large language models (LLMs) enable autonomous agents for reasoning, planning, and tool use. Recent systems increasingly organize these agents as graphs of specialized, interconnected nodes. Although graph-based orchestration supports flexible decomposition and coordination, it creates a key challenge: \textbf{attention allocation}. As workflows grow, existing approaches often execute graph components uniformly, wasting resources on irrelevant or low-impact tasks. We introduce \textbf{Attention Orchestration}, a paradigm that extends Transformer-style attention from token representations to workflow-level agent coordination. Our framework, \textbf{Adaptive Goal-aware Attention Orchestration (AGAO)}, dynamically estimates agent importance based on user objectives, graph dependencies, and computational constraints. AGAO combines three components: (1) goal-aware attention, measuring semantic relevance between user goals and agent capabilities; (2) topology-aware attention, modeling structural dependencies in agent graphs; and (3) resource-aware attention, allocating budgets and execution priorities across heterogeneous agents. Together, these mechanisms transform static agent graphs into adaptive systems that focus computation on goal-critical reasoning paths. Experiments across diverse multi-agent workloads show that AGAO improves task effectiveness while reducing unnecessary computation, latency, and token consumption compared with existing graph-based execution strategies. Our work establishes \textbf{Attention Engineering} as a direction for scalable, intelligent multi-agent systems. Code: https://github.com/MingzhouFan97/AGAO.

A central design principle in modern machine learning and artificial intelligence is to align a model's inductive bias with the structure of its input data. For matrix-valued inputs, relevant matrix-level relationships can be characterised through spectral values and spectral subspaces; however, common coordinate-wise rotation-gate data-encoding unitaries used in most quantum machine learning models do not explicitly construct such a matrix-level representation. We introduce Quantum Spectral Models (QSMs), in which we construct the generator of the data-encoding unitary directly from each input matrix. We study three QSM variants based on symmetric, global block, and non-overlapping patch-local block Hamiltonians. Their outputs admit truncated Fourier representations in which input-dependent spectral gaps supply candidate phase carriers, while spectral subspaces help determine their coefficients. We evaluate the QSMs and comparison quantum models on two matrix representations of Pendigits and two controlled synthetic tasks defined by spectral statistics. At the largest evaluated circuit depth, QSM variants lead the tested quantum models in mean test accuracy across all four benchmarks. The patch-local QSM leads on Pendigits, whereas the global block-Hamiltonian QSM leads on the controlled spectral tasks. Ablations show a task-dependent reversal: subspace-preserving controls perform better on Pendigits, whereas spectral-value-only controls lead among the tested ablations on the synthetic tasks. Together, these results shed new light on quantum machine-learning model design by showing how input-conditioned spectral representations can provide an analysable inductive bias, while offering a broader perspective on structure-aware model design in machine learning and artificial intelligence.

Local-first Agent Work Intelligence for coding agents: usage truth, recorded work, and honest joins. Read-only over coding-agent logs; zero-JavaScript localhost dashboard.

Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) rely on interconnected software and hardware components, including sensors, Electronic Control Units, in-vehicle infotainment systems, and telematics units, where vulnerabilities can compromise assets, users, and vehicle operations. These vulnerabilities are commonly documented as plain text in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database; however, security practitioners require structured information about affected assets, types of weaknesses, and attack behaviors to effectively mitigate the risks from these vulnerabilities. To this end, we evaluate open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) for generating Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX), a well-known structured format for representing threat information, for CAV-related CVEs. We construct a dataset called CAV-STIXGen that maps CAV vulnerability descriptions to STIX domain objects (SDO), STIX relationship objects (SRO), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), and MITRE ATT&CK techniques mappings. Using this dataset, we evaluated 11 open-weight LLMs (4B to 120B parameters) across various prompting strategies and temperatures. Single-model configurations achieve F1 scores of 0.94 for SDO, 0.63 for SRO, and 0.99 for CWE mapping, while complete MITRE ATT&CK mapping remains challenging. In a multi-agent setup, Gemma-4-31B and Codestral-22B achieve F1 scores of 0.91 for SDOs and 0.43 for SROs, respectively. Lastly, we analyze CWE and MITRE ATT&CK co-occurrences to identify recurring threat patterns in the CAV domain, demonstrating how AI-assisted vulnerability-to-STIX translation can automate threat intelligence and prioritize defense in transportation security.

Solana Ecosystem Volume & DEX Liquidity Dynamics